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Ideological Aspects, 1942 Aspects, -1900 run small businesses in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, a space of peasant-cultivated land in Dominica is known by people as "Cuba," and a Barbadian migrant was both a labor activist and a Garveyite in Panama and Cuba. Th e questions are, then, what is being done to tackle these issues and to look at these intertwined and connected histories? How much is told, and how much is lost, either because people have passed away or because documents have been destroyed? Or worse, how much remains unknown because researchers have ignored or underestimated the transnational connections within the Caribbean region? By looking at the history of migrants from the British Caribbean in Cuba during the early twentieth century, I have tried to open a window into the experience of many peoples who decided to cross the geographic, political, and linguistic boundaries of the Caribbean. In this essay in particular, I focus on the history of the organizational practices of these migrants in Cuba-their host society-and try to raise questions about yet other central issues within social science scholarship in the Caribbean: race, religion, and nation. Moreover, the story that emerges provides insights into the dynamics of identity formation of Caribbean peoples in transnational processes. Th e ability of social actors to use their multiple identifi cations is shown, thus presenting a challenge to social scientists using identity as a conceptual and analytical tool.
In the 1990s, I visited the Cuban towns of Banes, Baraguá, Chaparra, Delicias, and Jobabo, where many migrants from British colonies settled in the early part of the twentieth century. Some eighty years before my visit, these towns were semisegregated settlements composed of diff erent social groups: North Americans, Spaniards, Cubans, and migrants from virtually every Caribbean country. At the end of the twentieth century, they were like any other Cuban rural community, albeit distinctive in many ways. Despite the transculturation process, the social and spatial divisions that once existed were still noticeable, and there was evidence of each group's particular cultural traditions. Both Banes and Baraguá hosted at least three Protestant churches at little distance from one another, all either founded or attended mostly by British Antilleans and their descendants. Th e Pentecostal Church of Banes was erected in the former location of the Universal Negro Improvement Association's (UNIA) Liberty Hall. It was in that Liberty Hall that the Mount Sinai Church of Banes, led by a woman descendant of immigrants from the British Caribbean, held its fi rst meetings in the 1940s. In Jobabo, it was the other way around: the UNIA members held their meetings in the local Protestant church. What is now the bodega (local state-run food store) of La Güira section in Banes a was the location of the Jamaican Club, and one of the local schools in Baraguá is in the building that used to be the British Antillean's Unity Club. Within Baraguá, a section known as Bajan Town owes that name to the many Barbadian migrants who lived there. On a street in Bajan Town one can fi nd the Grenadian Hall, founded by migrants from Grenada in the early part of the century. In the 1930s this locale hosted meetings for the labor unions³ and nowadays serves as the place for the rehearsals of the folkloric group La Cinta, composed of descendants of migrants from the British Caribbean colonies. When I visited it, the main wall of the Grenadian Hall had a painting of two traditional cultural practices: the left half of the wall had a May Pole dance and the right half a cricket game.⁴ It was in Baraguá where I met nonagenarian Celia L. Campbell, born in Barbados. Formulating my question to her in the past tense, I asked about the allegiance to the British Empire among the migrant community in the early part of the century. She moved her aged and fragile body towards me and looking at my face said with great confi dence: "I am still a British Subject."⁵ Th ose are the remnants of history, giving evidence that despite the hostility against the black migrants from the Caribbean, their place in Cuban history was not erased.⁶ But the churches, associations, racial organizations, naming of towns and social clubs, and allegiance to the British Empire are evidence not only of the social practices of the Antilleans, but also of the diff erent and changing forms of their identifi cations. Instances of social and religious organization were responses to an unwelcoming social environment. Th e organizational choices of the immigrants were an assertion of their distinctiveness within Cuba generally, but also about who they were in particular contexts, and which identifi cation (that is, race, class, island) was more practical for specifi c purposes. By presenting the history of the migrants' organizational practices I am also illustrating how they used their identity and identities, and the advantages or problems those diff erent social and organizational identifi cations entailed.
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Giovannetti, "Historia visual y etnohistoria en Cuba: Inmigración antillana e identidad en Los Hijos de Baraguá," Caribbean Studies 30, no. 2 (July-December 2002): 216-52. s 6. Black Caribbean migrants (British West Indians and Haitians) were "undesirable aliens" frequently subjected to racist attacks by the press and by Rural Guards in the Cuban countryside. Th ey were accused of almost every problem arising in the country, from diseases and criminality to labor unrests and the erosion of Cuban nationality. See Alexandra Brown David, "Native and Not being our concern the restriction of the entrance of the fellow immigrants and considering that they come misled, ignorant of the real situation in the country, where [they] lower the level of the labor force worsening the situation of the workers that look for our subsistence here [in Cuba], the SCON [Segundo Congreso Obrero Nacional] agrees to ask all the Workers' Organizations in Cuba that they address their peers abroad advising them not to come to Cuba where the situation of the workers deteriorates more every day.¹⁵ 9. Jorge Ibarra, "La inmigración antillana," IV Encuentro de Historiadores Latinoamericanos y del Caribe, 1983 While the intention was not to antagonize, the workers clearly preferred foreigners to stay away from the country and leave the space to those who had to work for their subsistence in Cuba. Somewhat paradoxically, a Jamaican, Henry (Enrique) Shackleton acted as representative of the Antillean Workers' Union of Santiago de Cuba (Union de Obreros Antillanos de Santiago de Cuba) in the same labor congress that produced this a a manifesto.¹⁶ Th at same year, the Workers' Federation of Havana demonstrated against the government's attempt to divide local and foreign workers and blame the latter for labor confl icts. It opposed the idea that the "imported evil" had to be "eliminated through the deportation of foreign labor activists" and declared: "Among workers there is no distinction."¹⁷ Th e position of Afro-Caribbean workers as foreigners made their relation to the labor movement and workers' organizations one of ambiguity and ambivalence, as Marc McLeod has noted.¹⁸ Th is certainly presents a challenge to the researcher in tracing labor activism among migrant workers, yet Barry Carr has argued that evidence "of participation of black immigrants in Cuban labor unions is diffi cult, but not impossible to fi nd."¹⁹ Indeed, some evidence does show the activism of foreign workers in Cuban labor struggles. In 1923, for instance, during a general strike in the district of Camagüey, the press reported that: "Haitians, Jamaicans and native cutters have joined hand [s] in this concerted movement to secure increases in pay and the situation is becoming more acute each day."²⁰ Carr has been able to document the eff orts on the part of the labor and Communist organizations in Cuba to increase the participation of black workers, including Caribbean migrants. In what he labeled a movement of "pan-ethnic" solidarity, black migrants in the late 1920s and early 1930s refused to act as strike breakers, made demands to mill managers, were active in communist mobilizations, and had a role in the 1933 revolution.²¹ In the 1930s, during an instance of labor mobilization at the Senado Sugar Mill, it is reported that some of the delegates on behalf of the workers were Spaniards, Jamaicans, and Haitians.²² Th at a Jamaican by the name of Elijah Sigree was shot in one of the mobilizations also points towards the activism of migrant workers in the labor arena.²³ In a separate instance, Cuban workers on the railroad and steamship company went on strike because of the dismissal of "fellow workers who were foreigners."²⁴ Perhaps the most signifi cant attempt at formal labor organization by migrant workers is the Antillean Workers' Union mentioned above, which was founded in 1924, and remained active until the 1930s. In his account of the union, McLeod has shown how the organization struggled on behalf of immigrant workers, but at the same time against the "nativist tendencies of the organized labor movement in Cuba."²⁵ One of its leaders, Shackleton, had been active with a Garveyite by the name Dave Davidson in the People's Committee assisting West Indians in distress in 1921. Shackleton later joined other British West Indians, Cubans, and some Haitians in starting the union, an organization that was provided some space to state their positions in La Voz Obrera, the paper of the Dockworkers and Stevedores Union of Santiago de Cuba. But McLeod also shows how, as the economic situation in the country got worse in the late 1920s, the support for the foreign workers by the local organization changed. He stresses, nonetheless, that formal labor organization was not the only way in which immigrants (British West Indians and Haitians) struggled for the improvement of their situation as workers. Th ey challenged authority in the sugar mills (often personifi ed in the Rural Guards and guardias jurados in charge of security), moved from one plantation to another if labor conditions were not acceptable (using their mobility and establishing the terms in which they were going to work), and in some cases burning the cane fi elds.²⁶ According to Jorge Ibarra, the evidence seems to suggest that the Antillean workers were not necessarily contented with their wages, and gradually participated in the labor struggles in Cuba from the strikes in the 1910s up to their involvement with the Cuban Communist Party in the 1930s.²⁷ Th e limited evidence of migrant labor activism, then, cannot be automatically taken to indicate a lack of participation, as sometimes these workers kept a low profi le (or were protected by fellow workers) precisely for their vulnerable status in a foreign country. Also, by the 1930s, after the 1933 Nationalization of Labor Law, some migrants were using Spanish names and therefore, their presence in labor struggles is not completely evident in documentary sources. Organizing along racial lines in Cuba was a more complex issue for the migrants. Since the nineteenth century, non-white Cubans have been organizing on the basis of their color at diff erent levels and in various ways.²⁸ However, the three decades of struggle for independence (1868-1898) and its nominal accomplishment in 1902 under United States surveillance brought a diff erent set of rules to the game. Cubans, more particularly the elites, had to demonstrate their capacity for self-government and a certain level of "civilization" in the eyes of US offi cials. Civilization had to be Western civilization, one that had its own racial understandings favoring whiteness and despising blackness. Given that the independence struggle and its accompanying idea of nationhood were predicated on the basis of racial unity, organizing on the basis of race or skin color also seemed questionable. At the political level, some blacks and mulattoes-notably Juan Gualberto Gómez and Martín Morúa Delgado-joined the established political parties that were dominated by the white Creole elite. At the social level, other non-white Cubans did organize clubs and societies, despite the political pressures, but none of the existent societies presented a real challenge-ideological and practical-to the Creole establishment until the emergence of the short-lived Partido Independiente de Color (PIC). Th e price paid for an open questioning of the position of blacks within Cuba's "racial democracy" and struggling to obtain a "rightful share" in the country's social and political life was death. After an electoral defeat in 1908, the PIC was excluded from electoral politics by the Morúa Law, a regulation that prohibited the organization of people along racial lines in Cuba and bore the name of its proponent, Morúa Delgado, an Afro-Cuban politician himself. In 1912, the PIC organized an armed revolt that prompted the government's action and ended with the killing of between 3,000 and 5,000 black Cubans. Th e event in itself was reason enough for black Cubans to think twice about organizing on the basis of race and color, and certainly for black immigrants to hesitate in joining any type of racial organization. Considering that Jamaicans and Haitians-as a foreign "menace"-were accused of taking part in the PIC revolt,²⁹ one could assume that they would certainly Racial Organization and Strategy: The Case of the UNIA After its incorporation in the United States in 1918, Marcus Garvey's UNIA proliferated internationally, including in the Caribbean region, where it had been initially founded. Th e growth of the organization was signifi cant in those countries where British Caribbean islanders had gone in search of work, from the Panama Canal and railroads and banana plantations in Central America to the sugar centrales in the Dominican Republic and s Cuba.³⁰ Th e latter country emerged as one of the more fertile grounds for the development of the Pan-African organization with a total of 52 UNIA divisions. However, in conformity with the Morúa Law and the legacy of 1912, the UNIA was registered with the Cuban authorities as the "Universal Improvement Association and Communities League," avoiding the words "Negro" and "African" used in the original name.³¹ Th e racial nature of the organization disappeared, as it were, and as far as the authorities were concerned, the prime objectives of the UNIA-or UIA, for that matter-were the "confraternity between all its associates, assistance to members in need and the search of employment in the event of them requesting it."³² For the purpose of learning and instruction, the association would eventually establish colleges, academies, and schools. Membership was provided to "men of good conduct and morals; and it was essential to prepare a written application signed by the interested person, as well as two members."³³ Unlike the constitution and bylaws of the parent body in the United States, the Cuban version of 1920 avoided, at least in print, that part of the objectives that referred to the "uplift of the Negro peoples of the world" and also any reference to the fact that membership was for people of "Negro blood and African descent."³⁴ By 1921, the Havana Branch of the UNIA had among its members Barbadian William Preston Stoute. Stoute had been both a labor activist and a Garveyite in Panama, where the government had imprisoned him for participating in a strike, but also because of uneasiness about his presence during the upcoming visit of Marcus Garvey in 1921.³⁵ Other Garveyites and activists from Panama who moved to Cuba at the beginning of the 1920s were Samuel Percival Radway and Dave Davidson.³⁶ Th e organizational experience of members such as these in the Cuban UNIA divisions, along with the awareness of the problems of organizing along racial lines, probably prompted the strategy of avoiding any racial reference in the UNIA's public image. Nonetheless, in 1922 the Camagüey division did register the association under its full name in Spanish, including the words "Black Race" in its name, also stating that the purpose of the organization was the uplift of that race. Moreover, in contrast to the Havana Branch, in Camagüey it was explicitly stated that a requirement for membership was being a "person of the Black Race having a minimal drop of black blood in the veins." Further registrations of the UNIA included the word "Negro" and "African" in offi cial documentation. However, the bylaws and regulations of some of the Cuban divisions of the UNIA were written in a way that would not threaten the Cuban government. In their offi cial incorporation with the authorities, the regulations of some of the Cuban divisions of the UNIA stated that:
Its members have to swear to respect the right of every human race, the Government under whose jurisdiction they operate, not to interfere with the political aff airs of the country, not to speak against any other race . . . [and] not become interested in any discussion that would alter the peace, union, and harmony that must reign as the foundation of all well governed societies.³⁷ In Havana, the UNIA Branch 593 of Marianao, that had adopted the above regulations in 1929, seems to have developed a parallel body that one year before registered under the name "Society of Entertainment and Sport, Universal Negro Improvement Association." Its purpose was to "off er to its associates all kind of entertainment and sport" and its members had to "avoid discussions or acts that sustain political or religious principles."³⁸ In central Cuba, the Sagua la Grande UNIA branch also portrayed itself in a similar nonpolitical and nonactivist fashion, yet without hiding the racial character of the organization.³⁹ At some stages, the disparities and changes in the regulations brought members of the association into confl ict with one another.⁴⁰ But generally, the Cuban divisions of the UNIA portrayed themselves to state offi cials as organizations that would not pose any "danger" to the Cuban society in general, and to the elites and government offi cials in particular. Race, an otherwise key organizing principle of the UNIA and a main mobilizing force for its members, was thus displaced from occupying such a central position for the eyes of the Cuban authorities. However, that the organization's principal political stance had been strategically sacrifi ced did not mean that, internally, the UNIA lost its role in fostering racial consciousness among its members. To the contrary, Cuban Garveyites like Miguel G. Casanova, Carlos Collazo, Angel Estrada, and Pedro Montenegro wrote to the Negro World espousing the importance of the common hisd torical experiences of peoples of African descent in the Americas, and condemning the obstacles and inequalities suff ered by blacks in Cuba.⁴¹ Also, oral testimonies such as that of former UNIA member Juana Chapé Cárdenas show us the impact of the UNIA in the development of her racial consciousness. As a descendant of slaves from central Cuba, this black woman living in Jobabo was able to link her personal life story with the aims and purposes of the UNIA.⁴² Th e fact that the racial ideology of the UNIA infl uenced its members but was at the same time hidden away, illustrates Maingot's argument that "Caribbean peoples, have a capacity strategically to highlight or mute racial and color divisions in the pursuit of a desired goal."⁴³ Even with the concealment of race in the documents of the organization, by the very composition of its members, the UNIA was a black organization or, what was the same in Cuba, an association of Caribbean migrants.
As such, even with its nonracial and nonpolitical stance, the association was under close surveillance by both Cuban and US government offi cials, and was accused of "openly preaching racial war."⁴⁴ Th e strategic practice of the UNIA in Cuba illustrates Marc McLeod's argument that the movement "adopted diff erent forms in diff erent countries."⁴⁵ As he has noted, the UNIA fulfi lled a central role in providing a sense of commonality and self-assurance to British Antilleans and in assisting them to survive in a hostile environment. Th is role, it could be argued, worked primarily within the migrant community, and only on few occasions did the UNIA openly challenge the racial inequalities of the country in which the migrant workers were living, dominated by the Cuban government and US political interests. Th e Negro World did serve as a space where some migrants could condemn their d situation in Cuba, but as a general rule, the newspaper concentrated on positive descriptions of the meetings held by the diff erent branches and on reproductions of speeches of some of the leaders. UNIA leaders outside Cuba were uncritical of the actions of the Cuban government against the migrants. It was the local leadership of the organization in Cuba who criticized the conditions the migrants were experiencing (Eduardo V Th e contrast between the way the UNIA operated in the Cuban context and the discourse of its leadership, or indeed its principal leader, is perhaps more evident if one considers Garvey's visit in 1921. His arrival took place in complex times of economic depression and political transition with Mario García Menocal leaving the presidency to Alfredo Zayas. While Garvey did receive a high-profi le reception by government officials and leaders of the Afro-Cuban elite such as those in the Club Atenas, diff erences and contradictions existed between his Pan-African ideology and the Cuban socioracial landscape. Th is became evident in the words of Club Atenas' president Miguel Angel Céspedes who noted that due to their role in the constitution of the Republic, Cuban blacks "cannot conceive of having a motherland other than Cuba."⁴⁷ Garvey was then "cautious" in his pronouncements making clear that that he had no intentions of intervening in Cuba's domestic political issues,⁴⁸ and even concealing the racial nature of the organization. Pedro Pablo Rodríguez has stressed the contradictions in Garvey's speeches and his focus on the economic aspects and projects of the UNIA as an organization.⁴⁹ Once out of Havana, it has been suggested that Garvey spoke "with more freedom", something that Bernardo García Domínguez has attributed to the fact that the "development of the UNIA in Havana may not be representative of the rest of the country."⁵⁰ Indeed, there were regional diff erences in the country that had an eff ect on the composition of the UNIA, but as will be shown below, there were also diff erences in terms of how the organization operated and which of its many functions (as a religious movement, an From Race to Religion (or the other way around?): Beyond the UNIA What, then, was the role of the UNIA for Caribbean migrants in Cuba? I believe that the function of the organization was twofold. First, part of its importance was that it nurtured the organizational tradition of the immigrants on Cuban soil. Secondly, the UNIA had a defi nite impact on the self-support of the British Caribbean community as "an immigrant protection society"⁵¹ that operated mostly as a "civil religion."⁵² A glance at the reports of the UNIA in Cuba published in the Negro World indicates how the religious d character of the organization prevailed. Rather than assuming the stance of a politicized black organization, the UNIA worked more as a religious movement consistently adopting the proceedings of McGuire's Universal Negro Ritual. l l ⁵³ It is to no surprise, then, that McGuire had visited Cuba twice, before and after Garvey, but also that the visits of the former seem to have been better received and more successful than that of the latter. In the account of his travels in Cuba, and apparently conceding to McGuire's mobilizing skills, Garvey himself remarked:
From Moron I went to the little city of Nuevitas and there also I received another hearty response, and there the people "went over the top" 100 per cent. for the Black Star Line and the Libe[rian] Construction Loan, even though his Grace, the Chaplain-General, Dr. McGuire had been there and as an Archbishop, naturally he had cleaned up all Cuba and left not even a brass nickel there. [. . .] From Nuevitas, I went to the great stronghold of the Universal Negro Improvement Association Preston. In Preston, I also received a warm reception. Dr. McGuire had preceded me there, and I believe in two nights took away all the savings of the people of Preston. So when I arrived there to get some more they did the best they could, and I think that the best can be measured with the best of any other center of the Universal Negro Improvement Association, because they open-heartedly did everything they possibly could to make my trip there a success. From Preston, 51 Garvey used ill health as an excuse, and also avoided the word Negro when referring to the UNIA, which is perhaps an illustration of his awareness of the organization's concealment of race in its discourse within the Cuban context.⁵⁴ Garvey's speech and the particular references to McGuire are indicative of the emerging confl ict between the two UNIA leaders at the time, but also give some insights into the strong infl uence of religion in the organization in Cuba.⁵⁵ Th at the visits of McGuire seem to have been more successful and well received than those of Garvey is probably the best evidence of this. McGuire, who was the fi rst member of the UNIA's Executive Council to make an offi cial trip to the Caribbean, traveled to Cuba twice from January to March and then from May to July 1921. Garvey met with the incoming and outgoing Cuban presidents and with Havana's Afro-Cuban leaders, and was interviewed by the national press, before continuing his tour across the island and departing to Kingston. McGuire's visit had a lower profi le at the national level, but apparently had a signifi cant impact in the diff erent settlements of British Antilleans all across the island. In the complex mixture of the secular and religious functions of Garveyism in Cuba, the latter appears to be the most important. Th is, along with the concealment of UNIA's racial Despite the complications caused by the "religious question" at the higher levels of the organization (i.e., the confl ict between Garvey and McGuire, and the UNIA's position with regard to the church), it was precisely the religious aspect of the UNIA that served Caribbean migrants in Cuba best. In the history of the black peoples of the Americas in general, and the Caribbean in particular, religion had a signifi cant role as an outlet for resistance and protest. Garvey, as argued by E. Franklin Frazier in the 1920s, capitalized on this aspect,⁶⁵ and his movement therefore proved to be successful in adjusting to the cultural and ideological tradition of its members and prospective adherents. In a way, the particular needs of the affi liates of the organization were the ones who ultimately defi ned its nature and the role of the UNIA within their communities. For that reason, among the many facets of the UNIA, the interrelated functions as a religious movement and as an immigrant protection society became dominant.
As a religious movement, the ethos of the UNIA fi t within the religious tradition of many islanders from the British Caribbean colonies, but as an immigrant protection society, the UNIA would have to coexist with other ideological forces not necessarily in harmony with its values and beliefs. While the UNIA presented a challenge to British colonialism at other levels, by protecting the migrants in Cuba the UNIA ended up sharing that task with the consuls and offi cials of the British Empire. Such a paradox of criticism of, and alignment with, the British Empire illustrates both the defensive strategies of the migrants and also the contradictions embedded in the legacy of colonialism. Th e shared role in the protection of the migrants was evident particularly in the sugar crisis and deportations of 1921. In 1923, the British government considered granting offi cial recognition to the organization in order to cope with the amount of work that was being devoted to the attention of matters related to the British Antilleans. Such "quasidiplomatic" recognition would come into contradiction with British policy towards the organization in the colonies and elsewhere. After consulting with local colonial governments in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad, the semi-offi cial recognition was not granted.⁶⁶ It is signifi cant, however, that British Caribbean migrants themselves also chose their affi liation to the empire as the grounds for other organizational endeavors.
The British Empire and Black British Subjects' Organizational Practices
Even when one must recognize the UNIA's role on behalf of the migrants, it is important to note that most migrants used their affi liation to the empire as a survival strategy in Cuba, requesting support from the consuls, but also from the Foreign and Colonial Offi ces in London, the colonial governors in their islands of origin, and even the King and Scotland Yard.⁶⁷ Th e migrants' imperial affi liation was also evident in that they organized societies that were clearly based on their relation to the British Empire. Th is was expressed at what can be considered the island colony level or at the metropolitan level, the former being a sense of belonging to the British colonies of the Caribbean (same language and similar culture, however colonial it may be) and the latter expressed through their direct ties with Britain and the monarchy. It is telling nonetheless, that the UNIA served as the foundational organization for both the organizations based on island colony and metropolis. For example, the Jamaican Club of Banes and the Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos de Antillanos Británicos of Havana (1935) were created having the UNIA's Liberty Hall as their precedent.⁶⁸ Whether it was strategy or genuine belief in the empire and the altruism of its representatives, many of the societies formed by the migrants-especially in the 1930s and 1940s-were oriented around their links with the empire. Examples of these societies are the aforementioned "Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos" in Havana which would "make eff orts for the mutual cooperation of its members" and "maintain them in an amicable contact with the Government of the Metropolis, protecting the cause of any British Subjects, as long as such cause is offi cially reported and just."⁶⁹ Th e "Asociación de Súbditos Británicos" of Morón in Camagüey, active in the 1940s, accepted as members all the British subjects born in Cuba or other country "understanding that they are of British origin, and considering in all cases that the applicant speaks the English language."⁷⁰ Th e "Asociación Cultural de las Antillas Británicas de Cuba," explicitly said that the members would be those from the "BRITISH Antilles": "the Bahamas, Barbados, British Guyana, British Honduras, Jamaica, and the Leeward Islands, Trinidad, Tobago, and the Windward Islands."⁷¹ Th is illustrates that the founders of the association had a clear sense of the regional colonial space of the British Empire in the Caribbean region. Th e women also had their own organization named "Club de Mujeres Antillanas Británicas, Estrella de Londres #1," founded in 1942.⁷² In Baraguá, many of these associations, including the Imperial Club and the Unity Club, were also linked to the Cricket Club and actively played the "imperial game" in the community and with immigrants from other sugar plantations.⁷³ An evident contradiction here is that while the associations were establishing the link with the empire, parts of their registration documentation (including the names of the associations) were written in Spanish. Given the fact that many of the associations mentioned were founded in the 1930s and 1940s, one wonders how much this is related to a tension between keeping the imperial affi liation at a specifi c time, yet showing a suffi cient degree of assimilation to the Cuban (Hispanic) society through language. If one considers the Cuban nationalism of the 1930s and its manifestation in labor legislation aff ecting migrant workers, the latter alternative (assimilation) was certainly an attractive one. Th ose years were times not only of growing nationalism and xenophobia (against black migrants), but of political tensions and transitions. By registering the organizations with Spanish names, the migrants from the British Caribbean colonies were perhaps playing safe, as it were; yet one should not rule out that by the 1940s people active in these societies may have been born in Cuba and comfortable with the use of Spanish. Jamaican demographic data show that by 1943, a total of 6,713 people in Jamaica were registered as having been born in Cuba.⁷⁴ If Cuba held the second position as the country of birth of those residing in Jamaica by the 1940s, one can infer that many Cuban born West Indians were still in Cuba (an inference sustained by the visibility of West Indian communities to this date).
On occasions, the actual organization of these societies responded directly to the actions of the empire, as was the case of Th e British West Indian Progressive Association of Central Delicias, in Puerto Padre, and its partner in Central Chaparra, in northeastern Cuba.⁷⁵ Th ese two organizations were founded in anticipation of the visit of British offi cers Sir Francis Stockdale and Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes in 1943 to examine the situation of the British West Indians in the country. Th e representatives of the organizations met and were interviewed by the British delegation and "asked that they should be repatriated." Stockdale's report noted that these migrants "prefer to return to their island homes or to go to any other part of the British Empire." In contrast to migrants in other areas of Cuba, those of Chaparra "expressed a desire, in no uncertain terms, to be under the British fl ag."⁷⁶ It is evident that the Caribbean migrants in Chaparra and Delicias had organized themselves on the basis of their British identity for some purpose, namely to press for repatriation and to obtain the support and sympathy of the British authorities in that task. However, what becomes clear from Stockdale's recommendations is that the migrants would not be repatriated unless they were "destitute aged and chronic sick [sic [ [ ] " and that colonial authorities would then " c consider the repatriation" of "any r special cases" of people with "little possibility of their earning capacity being suffi cient to supply essential needs."⁷⁷ Th e 1943 report clearly was advocating for an improvement of the conditions of the British West Indians in Cuba through a number of measures. Stockdale argued, for instance, that "American sugar companies were responsible for the introduction of most West Indians into Cuba and they may be regarded as having a 74. " Table 4 moral obligation to their welfare."⁷⁸ Other recommendations included pressure on the Cuban authorities for the "exemption of British West Indians from the labor laws and regulations," changes in the labor and alien registration laws, the development of gardens and cooperative farms for the migrants, and grants for the improvement of medical and educational services in the West Indian communities.⁷⁹ Th e paradox here is that while Caribbean migrants were organizing themselves under their imperial allegiance to gain repatriation, the interest of the empire was that they remain in Cuba. After the labor disturbances in the British Caribbean colonies in the 1930s, it is likely, there were worries that the sudden repatriation of hundreds of unemployed workers would create further labor and social unrest in the British colonies.
Th e opinion of the British authorities of these associations was clear, when they noted that: "Like all negroes in more or less civilized communities, the British West Indians in Cuba show an aptitude for forming themselves into Clubs and Societies which usually bear very grandiose names."⁸⁰ British offi cialdom thought the motivation for the organization of the migrants was of a diff erent kind, noting that: "With very few exceptions, the British West Indian mutual relief societies which exist in Cuba seem to be used as a means for aff ording an easy living to their offi cers."⁸¹ Yet, at the same time, the authorities recommended the "encouragement of the voluntary aid and welfare societies with small grants on a proportional basis" controlled by the empire's consular offi cials.⁸² In that way, the British government hoped to keep the British West Indians in Cuba, and avoid any large and costly repatriation scheme that would aff ect both "UK Treasury" and the situation in the British Caribbean colonies.
Social Organizations and Caribbean Fragmentation: Some Questions
It is evident that British Caribbean immigrants in Cuba were not a passive or stagnant community during their stay in the country. Th ey created a number of societies and organizations in order to live, assimilate, and survive their experience abroad. Th is practice was surely anchored in an organizational tradition that developed during the nineteenth century in the British colonial Caribbean. After the end of slavery in the British Caribbean, former slaves and free people of color in the British West Indies organized in religious and secular ways, actively struggling as workers,⁸³ but also affi liating with diff erent Christian traditions and Friendly Societies.⁸⁴ Given the rapid development of these types of organizations in Cuba among British Caribbean communities, there is every reason to believe that many of these migrants had a Christian (Afro-Caribbean or European) background and that they had either been members of Friendly Societies or knew about their existence and the benefi ts obtained from them. Not only that, but early twentieth century Cuba was itself a fertile ground for a variety of social organizations; their host society had a history of Afro-Cuban organization, from the nineteenth century cabildos to the societies of color at the turn of the twentieth century. For a Caribbean migrant arriving at, say, the sugar plantations of Chaparra or Delicias; it may have been diffi cult to follow the exact tradition of social organization left behind. Yet it was not necessary to start over again by initiating a new club. In places like Chaparra and Delicias, the migrants found, already in place, a social setting that was divided with its own clubs and societies, such as the "Club Demócrata" for Cubans "of color" and the Club Delicias for white people.⁸⁵ Th is segmented microcosm provided the rationale for the migrants to create their own types of organization, but also reassured the newly arrived group, confi rming that the creation of clubs, societies, and churches was part of the way of life in the Cuban plantation society and a sensible thing to do. Sugar company towns were indeed segregated and divided, and the diff erent clubs and societies sustained political, racial, ethnic, and national divisions. Yet, it would be naïve to assume that those societies limited the organizational options of the diff erent peoples or that there was no contact between the diff erent social and ethnic groups living throughout Cuba or specifi cally within the company towns. In the community of Baraguá, there were diff erent social clubs as well, and while people knew "their place," as it were, friendly relations existed when each club held a fi esta (party) or a social event.
a ⁸⁶ About these interactions, an informant in the town of Jobabo even mentioned to me that "muchos jamaiquinos eran jamaiquinos pero . . . tu sabes, se adaptaron a la vida cubana . . . ron, fi estas." (many Jamaicans were Jamaicans, but . . . you know . . . they adapted to the Cuban life . . . rum, parties). s s ⁸⁷ Th e Garvey movement, for instance, while remaining as a society dominated by British West Indians, was an organizational eff ort that appealed to Afro-Cubans in a variety of ways, making them join the association and participate actively in its activities and ideology.⁸⁸ And as we saw, the UNIA also contributed to fostering an organizational tradition, by spearheading the formation of other clubs or organizations. Members of the UNIA were also affi liated with other clubs and/or churches at the same time. In the case of Dave Davidson, mentioned above, we also fi nd links between the UNIA and the labor movement. Davidson was active as a Garveyite in Panama and Cuba, but also served as secretary of the People's Committee (that preceded the Antillean Workers' Union) which joined forces with the UNIA and other labor organizations in assisting West Indians in the crisis of 1921.⁸⁹ How can we account for the cross-fertilization, infl uences, networking, and links that must have existed among these groups and organizations in the Cuban context, across time and linguistic and political frontiers? Th e history of organizational practices in the British Caribbean colonies provides some insights. Th e fact that working class nonwhite immigrants organized in multiple ways and in diff erent societies in Cuba must not come as a surprise if one considers that in some British islands since the early twentieth century "the societies appeared to have been confi ned to the coloured [sic [ [ ] population c and to the poor."⁹⁰ Also, that women organized independently in the Cuban context, as was shown, and that they were very active in the UNIA, is not surprising either when they had been active in Barbados since the nineteenth century through organizations such as the St. Michael's Female Friendly Society.⁹¹ What was the impact of the various organizational eff orts beyond both the Cuban context and the experience of the migrants in it? How important then was the organizational tradition of West Indians in labor and social struggles in Cuba? Or, how and in which specifi c ways did the experience of labor and social organization infl uence the activism of Caribbean migrants on their return to their islands of origin? How much of the development of Friendly Societies in the British Caribbean during the 1930s and 1940s and the increase in membership in some cases, can be attributed or related to the experiences of people abroad in places like Cuba, Central America, and the Dominican Republic?⁹² It is revealing that, as they did in Cuba, West Indians in their countries of origin held membership (and offi cial positions) in more than one society or church.⁹³ Behind all these questions and the complex issues discussed above, what emerges is the ability of the migrants from the British Caribbean to establish multiple associations and organize in diff erent ways within the host society, but also how they were capable of extending their organizational experience beyond national and linguistic boundaries. In what resembles Charles V. Carnegie's conceptualization of "strategic fl exibility," the migrants I have studied here were able to use the multiple organizational options they had available (in both their host society and their islands of origin) to live and survive their experience of transnational mobility within the region.⁹⁴ Many of the questions raised here remain unanswered by the scope of this essay, but those links and cross-Caribbean connections of peoples, ideas, and practices are to be found only through social and historical research that crosses linguistic and political barriers within the region.
Organizations and the Use of Identity
Th e diff erent organizational and mobilizing eff orts of the immigrants within the Cuban context certainly triggers many questions about the nature of their racial, ethnic, national, and religious affi liations. Stuart Hall has noted that in "the diaspora situation, identity becomes multiple,"⁹⁵ and it is clear that in the case presented here, the migrants not only had multiple ways of identifying, but they manifested their various identifi cations and self-understandings through the ways they organized. Th e immigrants of whom I have written here were blacks, workers, men, women, and either Baptists, Pentecostals, or Anglicans at diff erent times and in diff erent locations and contexts. Th ey were also colonial subjects of Britain in the Caribbean, individuals who could either be loyal to that empire or able to challenge it if needed; British Caribbean immigrants who were indeed Caribbean, yet not necessarily British (or considered as such). Th ey were West Indians who-as David E. Lewis once put it-were neither "West" nor "Indians."⁹⁶ Th ey could be also "people of color" diff erent from the Cuban understandings of being "of color," but at the same time shared with Afro-Cubans a sense of commonality strong enough to rally together behind the same organizations and movements, be it the UNIA or the labor struggles. If their identity was multiple given the diasporic context in which they found themselves, which was then their actual identity? Were they British West Indians? Were l they Barbadians or Jamaicans? Were they blacks, British subjects of the empire, or black British subjects? What did British Caribbean migrants have, if anything, that made them identical to one another? And, if they had something in common at certain moments, how did that commonality operate and under which circumstances? Did that sense of communal belonging provide them with an identity in a particular moment, as when they unmistakably self-identifi ed as British subjects to British offi cialdom? Here-and in the essay as a whole-I am trying to take on board recent criticisms of the concept and practice of identity within the fi eld of social and human sciences by Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper.⁹⁷ Th at the British West Indians organized on the basis of religion, ethnic origin, race, or colonial background is evidence enough to say that they had a specifi c self-understanding and that they felt something in common at a specifi c time and in a determined set of circumstances. We cannot assume, however, that because most of them were, or projected themselves, as Christians, there were no diff erences among the various nonconformist religions active in the migrant communities. It has also been evident in my research that we cannot assume that because all were British subjects they were uncritically loyal to the British Empire, or that there were no distinctions, diff erences, or tensions, among the diff erent islanders.⁹⁸ Indeed, there were moments in which the island of origin became an important factor to obtain repatriation during the diffi cult periods of sugar crisis in 1921 and the economic depression in the 1930s. At the same time, the British Caribbean migrants were also categorized by others, be it the Cuban elite, the Cuban print media, the British consular offi cials, the Rural Guards on the plantations, or the immigration offi cers in their port of arrival. Th ese aspects would surely have an infl uence on the way (or ways) in which the migrants self-identifi ed and related to other individuals in the social landscape. While, as Brubaker and Cooper have noted, it is problematic to say that "Identity is something all people have, or ought to have, or are searching for,"⁹⁹ the organizational eff orts of the migrants indicate that "identity" (or a particular identifi cation) was something that the migrants used, in practice, at determined moments and contexts.
In that sense, identity may have not been the "necessary result" or "outcome" of a social process.¹⁰⁰ Rather, the use of a specifi c identifi cation may have been motivated by the need to achieve a specifi c outcome in the social landscape where the migrants were living. Here, perhaps, I want to stress further the emphasis on process and agency in Brubaker and Cooper's proposal, but also that of social situation as a factor in the choices of (and for) identifi cation.¹⁰¹ I believe that black British Caribbean migrants in Cuba, as a whole, did not have an identity "without being aware of it." My research, and other studies, illustrate that migrants-as agents-were aware of the diff erent identifi cations they had at their disposal, and the variety of common links and associations they had with other migrants and other people. Th ey were also aware of the location and time in which they could use any of their multiple identifi cations. In the Caribbean, it has been noted, linguistic and religious boundaries and ethno-racial categories-constructed by social scientistsare constantly crossed by individuals and multiple identities have been seen by local populations as an advantage.¹⁰² Th is was certainly the case of Caribbean migrants in Cuba during the early twentieth century. Even if we turn to the contemporary context, descendants of migrants from Jamaica and the Eastern Caribbean have reasserted their foreign social and cultural background to survive during the hard times of the "special period," either by reestablishing links with their islands of origin (through churches), or using their familiarity with English to obtain work in the tourist industry. Th erefore, while for the social and historical analyst identity may not be the best conceptual tool (or word) to tackle the dynamics presented here, for the migrants and their descendants, in practice, identity did actually "do a great deal of work."¹⁰³
